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Since time immemorial, the world's major religions, from Hinduism
and Buddbism to Christianity, have preached nonviolence and enjoined man, "Thou shalt not kill." Yet actuaIly even those who
otherwise practiced their religious beliefs accepted and even condoned the use of force when necessary for self-defense. Depending
on circumstances, such resort to force, again and again, has been
interpreted as legitimate defense of individual, tribe. or nation.
In the 20th century we, who have wrested so many secrets from
nature, who believe that man has the capacity to control his environment, who dream of landing on the moon, are still no better
prepared than the Neanderthals to remove the threat of ultimate
resort to force; and this in spite of the prospect that today force,
involving nuclear weapons, could wreak destruction beyond any
experienced in history.
Assuming that all human beings, whether Communists or non& m m h t s , want to avoid an apocalyptic clash, what new roads
can we fiad to avoid the ultimate catastrophe of war?
our three-level world
In this search, we must r e d i that the world we live in, like drama
in a modern theatre, is operating on a three-leveI stage. The three
Ievels are ( 1) the nation-state; (2) the regional organization, poIiti1

cal, economic, or military-NATO, SEATO, CENTO. ANZUS,
the Warsaw Pact which holds together the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern
European satellites, the Organization of American States (OAS),
and the proliferating European agencies, notably the Common
Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic
Agency; and ( 3 ) the world community, represented by the United
Nations and the specialized international agencies, notably the
World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (KO),
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
At each level, each ofthese three groups seeks to make decisions
on the same problems, frequently with little or no attempt to consult
the others. What often mults is the kind of snarl which would occur
at any large city's busy intersection if all cars, trucks, bicycles, and
pedestrians insisted on moving ahead at the same time in whatever
direction they chose, disregarding the signals of harassed policemen.
Yet the very variety of these multi-level operations makes fo~
Rexibiiity in the search for peace.

from Berlin-Examples of this variety are all around us. For instance, the pmb
bm of West Berlin has, at one and the same time, been discussed
by the Western powers with each other; by their ambassadors in
Moscow individually with the Soviet pvernment; by the U.S.S.R.
with East Germany; formally by NATO; and informally in the
corridors of the UN,of which neither West nor East Germany is a
member. Meanwhile, it has been suggested by Moscow that West
Berlin be placed under the guarantee of the UN, and by Washington that some international agency supervise access to that city.

fa South Vietnam-Or take another problem which many observers have regarded as
an even greater threat to peace than Berlin--South Vietnam. n i s
nation was carved out of the former French colony of Indo-Chma
in 1954 at an international conference in Geneva where Communist
China, whose government is not recognized by Washington, was
present alongside the United States. At this conference Vietnam,
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one of the three Indo-Chinese states (the two others are Laos and
Cambodia), had been divided into Communist-contro1k.d North
Vietnam and non-Communist South Vietnam by an agreement
Washington did not sign, but its NATO allies Britain and France
did. The conferees also set up an international commission composed of India, Canada, and Poland which was to insure that no
additional foreign military personnel or material other than those
maintained by Fmce would be sent into South Vietnam. Neither
Laos nor Cambodia was to join in military alliances or to permit
their territories to be used for foreign military bases, and both
sides in Vietnam were also prohibited from doing so.
When it became apparent in 1961 that Communist forces from
North Vietnam were infiItrating into South Vietnam as guerrillas in
a "war of liberatio~i"which Moscow regards as legitimate, the
United States started to send military personnel to Saigon. These
military were supposed only to train South Vietnam trmps for
guedta warfare without participating actively in military operations, but it was feared that they might eventually become engaged

in combat.
The presence of these military was opposed by the international
commission, but its opposition was not heeded by Washington,
that without American military aid South
Vietnam might be overwhelmed by Communist f o m , and that
its conquest would not only spetl the same fate for Laos and
Cambodia, but open the way to Communist penetration of Thailand
and the rest of Southeast Asia and the disintegration of SEATO
(the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Yet neither South
Vietnam, nor Laos, nor Cambodia is a member of SEATO. And
?he United States did not think it necessary to bring the Vietnam
war, which Pelcing threatened to enter, before the UN although
Carnlmdia and Laos are UN members.

which took the view

b Cuba

Or

take still mother instance of a menace to world peace. The
revolution staged in Cuba by Fidel Cartro was regarded by the
United States as a threat not only to its security, but also to that
of the OAS. Yet without consulting the OAS, Washington in 1961
sponsored, m e d , and transported to Cuba an invasion force of

Cuban exiles which was expected to bring about the overthrow d
the Castro regime but found it impossible to perform the task.
When it became increasingly apparent that Castro was tryhg to
spread his ideas to other c o u n t r i ~of Lath America, the United
State9 sought to win the support of the OAS for strong measagainst Cuba. At the Punta &I Este, Uruguay, conference of
January 1962, however, Washington succeeded in obtaining tbe
unanimous agreement of Latin American countries only for the
view that Cuba's Marxist-]Leninist system was incompatible with
that of the Western Hemisphere and barely obtained the newssary vote (14 to 1 with 6 abstentions) to a resolution providing
for exclusion of the Castro government from the OAS. Although,
in Washington's opinion, a Communist-dominated Cuba endangered
world peace, the United States opposed discussion in the UN of
the OAS action on Cuba,as demanded by Moscow and its satellites,
and won the support of all the other Latin American countries,
which oppose intervention in OAS &airs, as we11 as of some
African and Asian nations.
In these, and many lesser crises, the three possible paths to peace
-national, regional, and international--have criss-crossed each
other with ao clear demarcation ktween them and often with
serious danger of collision. Yet each road, if well-marked and d e
limited, serves a useful purpose in tbe search for peace.

THE NATION ROAD
the three roads, that of the nation comes most naturally to alI
peoples, whatever their race, color, religion, ideolosy, or degree of
economic development. It seems reasonable to most citizens that a
nation should act in defense of what it regards as its interests, just
as t r i k fought with each other for survival before they grouped
themselves into nations or as American frontiersmen once whipped
out their guns in the wild West.
Yet today. as one hears the problems of various nations-problems once regarded as subject only to their sovereign decisions-as
they are discussed in NATO or the OAS or the Common Market
or at gatherings of the Communist blm, and mast of all in the UN
General Assembly, one cannot help but wonder: Are nutiorrs perOf

haps becoming obsolete? But then one sees 1 10 flags flying in the

UN Plaza on New York's East River. These flags make us sharply
aware that not onty are the nations of Western Europe and the New
WorId still very much alive today, as one can see by the opposition
of French President de Gaulle to supranational organizations, but
nearly half of the UN's members have emerged since World War 11.
Far from being obsolete, nationalism shows greater vitality than
ever as one people after another in Asia, Africa, the Middle East,
and Latin America demands its place in the world community.The
old established great powers (both the dernwracies and he
U.S.S.R.)often express alarm in the UN about the emergence of
these newcomersaome with ancient histories and vast populations
but weak economically, others tiny in size like Togo or Upper Volta
in Africa Thase newcomers, say both Western and Soviet critics,
create a danger by their inexperience in world aflaiw and their
alleged lack of responsibility. The great powers believe that it
would be far better if they, who consider themselves responsible
and experienced, were given a free hand with no interference by the
weak and small.
The new nations, for their part, fear that the great powers (both
the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc) may use their military and
financial might in an irresponsible way and plunge the world, by
design or by accident, into nuclear war. Great-power dominance,
which the non-Western peoples once regarded as a dangerous
attribute of Watern powers, is now seen to be an attribute of aII
large and powerful nations, including those of the Communist nonWestern sector-the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. But while
both great and smdl nations are now invoived in regional groups
and in the UN,and to this extent accept certain limitations on their
national sovereignty, all zue reluctant to entrust their security to
agencies outside4heir own borders and hold loyalty to the nation
above concern for international organizations.

what is nationalism?
What is the essence of nationalism, stubbornly treasured by those
who have it and sought with fierce determination by those who
have yet to experience it? There are many ways of describing
nationalism-in t e r n of geography, mce, language, reiion. At its
5

worst it can degenerate into violent
as it did in Germany
uader the Nazis. At its best it represents a &&ated love of we's
f a t h e m or, a the French say, one's put&; it is patriothm,
Nations may lack mntigmw h m r y , liDEe Pakistan; or far
centuries ewen a m h i c home, like the Jews now atabrished in
the state of Israel. They may have a single laaguage or religion;
bat they may a h include several races, languages, or rdigiomi, like
India, the United States, the U.S.S,R., and the mdd-mid couutrh
of East A f r h In -,
what m&s a nation Is a sense d

~w~SandWti0116,asenseofbetolrgingtoagiwm
gooplc, of W d identity." The Fmch philosopher Renan uses
the phrase 'the gout of a nation,"

nationalism-herdic01

or parochiul?

The "soul" of a nation is a precious asset not only to its people
but also to the world community, provided it is used not as a
weapon against other nations but as a p i n t of departure for estab
lishing shared relations with them, thereby enriching aII. Today
it is difficult to realize that when nation-states began to emerge
after the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, nationalism seemed
a heresy to those who believed in an all-embracing realm under the
Church. George Bernard Shaw vividly portrayed this feeling in his
play Saint Joan, where the French Bishop of Beauvais, Peter
Cauchon, says: "But as a priest I have gained a knowledge of the
minds of the common people; and there you will h d another
dangerous idea. 1 can express it only by such phrases as France for
the French, England for the English, Italy for the Italians, Spain
for the Spanish. It is sometimes so narrow and bitter in country
folk that it surprises me that this country girl can rise ahwe the
idea of her village for its villagers. But she can. She does. .

..

''To her the French-speaking people are what the Holy Scriptures
descrik as a nation. CaIl this side of her heresy. Nationalism, if
you will. I can find no better name for it. I can only teIl you it is
essentially anti-Catholic and anti-Christian, for the Catholic Church
knows only one realm of Christ's kingdom. Divide that kingdom
into nations and you dethrone Christ."
Now that the world has been divided into more than a hundred
nations, far beyond the imagining of any medieval W e r , now that
" s e l f d e t e ~ t i wof nations" flourishes everywhere, there is again
a feeling that nationalism can become a danger unless it is wwen
into the fabric of larger units.
The danger today is that the world will become full of national
entities so small and weak that they will be helpless to survive and
may, as w n as they are freed from Western mldal rule, fall prey
to the encroachments of Communist powers or of their own
stronger n e i g h h . There is no doubt that the nation continues to
serve essential purposes, both in the administration of the people
and the resources within its borders and for the expression of the
national genius. But in the increasingly complex world of our
times, with the interweaving of science, technology, industry, and
weaponry which laces across bders, the nation is no longer the
7

principal road to a people's security and prosperity. Even the most
fervent nationalists realize that nations must seek aid and protection
tbrough collective solidarity, either in regional organizations, in the
UN, or in both. Nationalism is no longr the heresy it seemed in the
Middle Ages. But, like the village parochialism St. Joan defied, it is
no longer sdcient for contemporary needs.

THE REGION ROAD
Since World War 11, while building the UN, whose functions are
yet to be fully developed, nations in all the continents have also
created a wide variety of regional organizations. Some of these are
built on the old pattern of military alliances that has existed since
the dawn of history. NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, the
Warsaw Pact, aside from the ideological content of their pronouncements, do not differ in essence from Greeoe's Delian League,
the Triple Alliance of 1882 (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy),
the Triple Entente of 1907 (Britain, France,Russia), or the Allies
and the Centrd Powers of two world wars. All these, too, even
before the existence of communism, had ideological connotations
as well as military purposes.
An important difference today is that, if the provisions of the
UN Charter for collective security can be made effective, these
various alliances would presumably no longer be regarded as necessary or acceptable and might gradually fade away since there would
be an international alternative to national military power. Meanwhile, one of the dficultia of existing military alliances is that, no
matter how much their members try to endow them with other
£unctions, it has prwed dif6cdt to transform instruments designed
in the first instance for military defense into institutions for emnomic cooperation or for assistance to fomer coionial territories.
For example, Afticatl wuntries, upon attaining independence,
had no d&re to become dgned with NATO which to them still
lwks like a militmy bloc dominated by former oolonial powers.
Similarly, Yugoslavia, which in the days of Stalin came to the
conclusion that a Communist great power can be as "imperialist"
as a democracy, daes not see the Warsaw Pact as a source of aid to
its future development. Nor has it proved easy for either of the two

great power b l w , the West or the Swiets, to keep their respecCiw
members in line on matters military or ideorogical during a pmlonged period of "coexistence" when, in the absence d mortal
combat, alfiances provide no cement for divided and sometimes
codicting interests.

economits-yes;

politic~o

Far more successful than military alliances have proved ehrts to
build regional maperation on the basis of common economic and
scientific interests. In Western Europe the Common Market, the
Cod and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Agency have
demonstrated that three important practical needs-for trade, for
industrial ~ U T C ~ and
S , for atomic energy--could overcome p n
found national differences and jealousies, although not without
sharp growing-ph*
Europe's gmdual economic integration has not only s p d the
United States. Canada, and Britain to sbare in the anticipattd
benefits of a vastly enlarged m a r k , but has inspired other regions
to consider comparable developments for Africa and Latin America.
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet bloc, through its ewnomic organization, COMECON, has succeeded in marshaling the
resources of agrarian and more or less industrialized economics
both for mutual exchanges of goods aad for joint aid to underdeveloped cormtries--although so far with major advantages for
the U.S.S.R. But as each auch economic organization bas come into
existence, nations not included in it have expressed grave concern
about the possibility that economic regionalism might pme wen
more dangerous to their interests than the nationalism of natistates, and that the world might m n break up into a few closed
or semi-closed economies instead of expanding into a free world
economy. Thus the members of the Commmwedth from Australia,
New Zealand, and Caaada to countries of Asia and Africa have
expressed concern about the participation of the United Kingdom
in the Common Market.
The achievements of regional economic cooperation, slow and
limited as they may appear to some, have had no counterpart in

I
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political integration Although a CoumiI of Europe exists, there
has as yet been no indication that even the technologically advanced
camtries of Western Europe and North America, which share
common traditions and have comparable institutions, are ready to
give this Council an important role or to join in an Atlantic Community; or that Moscow's Eastern European satellites, in spite of
prolonged Comrnunist indoctrination, cornmon fear of Germany,
and a common Slavic heritage in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Bulgaria, are wiling to accept its dictation beyond the point of
unavoidable n-ity;
or that the countries of Asia, the Middle
East, or Africa are ready to come together under the leadership of
a single power, be it India, Japan or Egypt, or Ghana or Nigeria.
Those who are troubled by the slow growth of the UN might ask
themselves why the politically democratic, highly educated, and
tecbnoIogidly advanced Western nations have been unable to
unite siace the days ofCharlemagne; and why Eastern Europe has
been held together, in uneasy cohabitation, only by force.
In all continents, regional organizations, valuable as they may be
for certain practical purposes, do not seem able to hoId within
bounds the larger aspirations of nations which are increasinglp
aware that trade and scienoe, armaments and politim, not to speak
of outer-space exploration, cannot be fully developed or controlled
within a framework narrower than that of the world.

THE WORLD ROAD
In contrast to the nation-state and the regional organization, each
of which has geographic and psychologicd limitations, the world
community now in the making, as represented by the UN and other
international agencies, aims to include all the peoples of the glob
and, within the limits of their resources, to serve them all. Because
of its potentially universal scope, the UN reflects most clearly the
vast changes that are sweeping the world. At the same time its
activities. modest as they are when compared to the objectives set
forth in the UN Charter, foreshadow new paths to peace.
First of all, it is in the UN that the post-World War I1 change in
relationships between the great powers and the small is most strikingly evident. The emergence of small nations has profoundly

altered the role. and thus the influence, of all great powers, &
muaist and non-Communist. Today the great powers
no Ionger
dominate the UN as they did when the worId organhtiw was
created in I945 and when the Big Five (Britain, France, the
U.S.S.R., the United States, and Nationalist China) obtained the
right of veto in the Security Council in spite of strong o p p i t i o n by
the small nations. True,the United States and the U.S.S.R. can, if
they wish, wield the ultimate weapon of nuclear arms. But if they
want to achieve their objectives without resort to force, they must
seek to win the support of large, although relatively weak, newly
independent nations such as hdia; of nations not new, but now
determined to exercise greater influence, such as Argentina and
Mexioo; and of the many small nations whose expanding ranks
are making the waIls of the Assembly hall buIge.
What we are witnessing on the world scene is a change comparable to that which occurred in the societies of Wtxtem Europe

as a result of the English, French, and American revolutions. Then
the gradual extension of the vote to larger and still larger numkrs
of the population brought a h u t political democratization and expansion of economic and m i a l opportunities for more and more
people. Through these changes the poor gradually became the
equals of the strong and the rich-not necessarily in terms of
material assets or physical power or influence, but in terms of the
right of each citizen to cast one vote. The rich, the more highly
educated, the more socially influential could still exercise greater
influence than the p r . But if the few wanted to carry through the
projects they favored. they had to enlist the political support of
the many. They could not do so by casting, as individuals, more

than the poor.
Today some of the great powers favor weighted voting in the
UN. They would give more votes to those nations which have the
largest populations or the richest natural resources or the most
developed economies or the highest level of education. Such a
system now prevails in the World Bank. In the broader sphere of
the UN, however, these proposals have no more chance of success
than the attempts made in some democratic wieties to give special
voting privileges to the rich or to the better educated or to those
who are white instead of some other color.
votes

one notion, one vote
True, a nation which represents a group of human beings cannot
be compared exactly with an individual citizen, But until individual
citizens can be directly represented on a voting basis in the UN
or in regional political organizations like the Council of Europe,
there is no unit to deal with except the nation. As a corporate
entity acting on behalf of its citizens, the nation, for the time being,
can be compared to the individual voter in the nation-state. In the
world community, as within the mdern nation-state, any attempt
to set up first-class citizenship for a few, while relegating the many
to second, third, or whatever other rank might be devised, will be
rejected by the UN members affected as an intolerable discrimhation. Those citizens of great powers who regard equality of voting
in the UN as unfair are urged by Louis J. Halie, former member of
the State Department Policy Planning Staff, in his book Men and

Nations, "not to forget that the fifty non-sovereign American statut
are equally represented in the Senate of the United States, ot*that
the twenty-two Swiss cantons are equally represented in the Cowid
of States at Berne, just as the hundred or more members of the
United Nations are equally represented in the General AssembIy."
It may well be, as Mr. HaUe points out, that voting amqem&
for our Senate, and for the Swiss Coundl of Stam, "no longer
represent an existing logic, but they do represent workability."
Perhaps, eventually, it will seem advisable to alter representation
in our Senate, and in the Swiss Council, and in the UN General
Assembly. In haman affairs nothing is eternal. If enough citizetlg
in the United States, and enough nations in the UN, want to make
changes, this should not prove beyond human capacity. Tbe UN
is not a static organization, any more than is our political system or
the system of any nation. Many suggations for changes in the UN
structure are already being offered, but so far most of them are
&signed to broaden the participation of all members, rather than
to strengthen the rights of the great powers.
Moreover, sooner or later the smaller nations, which when acting
together will soon command a majority, may press for termination
of tbe great powers' special privilege, their veto in the Security
Council-id the Big Five do not gracefully relinquish if of their
own free win. Meanwhile, UN oficids have reoDgnized the need
to broaden the representation of the new nations in the organs and
on the staff of the world organizatim. In the future it may prove
necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council,
hitherto dominated by the five permanent great powers, as well as
of the Ewnomic and Social Council whose influence may be
expected to grow as problems of economic and social devetopment
in the noa-Western areas assume increasing importance.

the "multilohrul urnbrello"
Critics of the UPJ also frequently argue that the new nations need
the world organization far more than tbe great powers, implying
that for this reason the smaller nations should in some way d&r
to the big ones. This contention is not supported by the realitits of
today's world. As Andrew W. Cordier, former executive assistmt
to the UN SeFretary General, bas pointed out, the great powers

need the ON as much as the smaIl. In his words, the UN serves as
a "multilateral umbrella" for world diplomacy, under which the
great and small can thresh out and adjust their differences.

neither--nor
There is a second aspect of the UN that points to the future-and
that is the picture of the world mirrored in the debates of the
General Assembly. These debates, in which all members of the
UN participate, reveal thc realities of the international situation
more accurately than negotiations between nations or within
regional organizations, which are often obscured by old concepts
whose reiteration over the years blocks the initiation of new policies.
Viewed from the United States, two main factors appear to rend
the world community : the ideological struggle between communism
and democracy; and a continuing conflict between what is left of
Western colonialism and the aspirations of newly Iihrated co1wial
peoples and peoples still struggling for independence. Seen in this
light. the world seems menaced by a head-on collision between the
two great-power blocs of the West and the Communists; and the
Communists might win ultimate victory by obtaining the support of
non-Western peoples who are believed to be dominated and guided
by an anti-colonialism which has produced anti-Westernism.
But seen from the UN forum, the outlook is vastly different.
There it becomes clear that there are many degrees of liberty and
authoritarianism. What becomes evident in the UN is that neither
Western democracy nor communism has won a clear-cut victory in
the non-Western areas; and that the largest segment of the world,
as yet neither democratic nor Communist, is in a fluid state, subject
to many unpredictable changes in the years ahead. Nor-judging
by the votes cast in the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council,
the Economic and Social Council, and even the Security Councildo the new nations slavishly follow the directions d the U.S.S.R.,
any more than they do those of the Western powers.

"no alternative

)o

decolonization"

As for the alleged enmity of former and present oolonid nations
toward the West, it is true that nations which were only yesterday
ruled by Britain, France, BeIgium, and the Netherlands, or are
14

still ruled by Portugal snd Spain, have a vivid conscioumm of heir
grievances, past or present, against their foreign ruIers. This should
come as no surprise to Americans. It has takw nearly twr, hundred
years for descendants of the American colonkts to overcome their
opposition to colonialism as practiced by Britain-and it has k n
achieved only because the colonial powers have mgnized since
1945, as the French newspaper LR M n d e put it in 1962, that there
is "no alternative to decotonization." To expect that, in contrast
to Americans, the Asians, Africans, and Arabs can shed their
memories of colonial experience within months, or even years, L
unrealistic. k t us bear in mind, tm, that the American rebels were
of the same origin, wlor, and economic and social background as
the colonizers and were thus spared the psycho10gkaI tensions of
racial discrimination which have been the harshest feature of
colonid rule.

persisting memories
To the black and brown peoples of these nations, colonialism still
means rule by whites wer men and women of color--and they see
this system still very much alive today in Angola and Mozambique,
in the Modesias, in South Africa, and until yesterday in Algeria
To them the colonialism imposed by the U.S.S.R. in Eastern
Europe, or by the Chiiese in Tikt, has not hitherto had the same
poignant significance as the rule of whites over non-wbites. (And
for our part we must admit that in the United States there has been
far more indignation about Russia's treatment of the Hungarians
than about France's treatment d the Algerian Muslims.) It is only
when Asians, Africans, and Arabs are seen to be treating each
other no less ruthlessly than whites have treated non-whites in their
overseas colonies (for example as the Chinese have done in Tibet
or Moise Tshombe in the &go)
that the emotions previously
roused by Western ootonialism are stirred also against non-Western
oppression. And we must bear in mind that Americans who invoked
the spirit of our revo1ution in supporting the a n t i ~ o l o n i bof
non-Western peoples had done far more to shake the foundations
of Western empires before World War I than the Communists, not
yet then in power in Russia or China, bad been able to do.
Only when all remainhg vestiges of Western colonialism have

been eradicated, or are seen to be definitely on the way to extinction, will it be possible for the new nations to refocus their attention
and b m m e as concerned with Communist wlonialii as they have
been in the past with that of the West. But even so, the Arab-AsianAfrican oounbies in the UN have already displayed more restraint
in discussing the role of Portugal in Africa, the future of the Belgian
trust territory of Ruanda-Umndi, and even discrimination against
Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa than some Americans have shown when our economic interests have been challenged
in Emt, or Cuba, or Brazil.

development of all by all
The third important trend revealed by the experience of the UN
is that while efforts to achieve pofiticd solidarity are often frustrated, cooperation between nations in economic, social, and scientific development has proved not only feasible but highly successful.
In its short history the UN has put far more emphasis on
economic and s d a l development than on political activities. As of
2961, some 16,000 UN staff members out d a total of 18,000
were working in economic and social affairs and on technical
assistance, and 85 per cent of the UN's modest funds was expended
on these activitia in "ordinary times1'-that is, when the Congo
was not in a critical situation. But if development is not merely to
widen the rapidly growing gap between the rich nations and the
p r nations (which means htween the technologicalIy advaucd
and the technologically backward), it must be carried forward on
a much larger scale. And it must not be d i m e . primarily by iindividual great powers or by groups of great powers, but though the
UN by all for dl.
For it is not only the great, tachnologically advanced powers,
whether of the West or of the Soviet bloc, which can contribute
funds, money, raw materials, food, scientific experience, and
technical know-how to those nations which are latecomers to the
Industrial Revolution. The small and the weak can also contribute
special products or special skiIls or special experience. Israel, India,
Yugoslavia, Egypt, and other non-Western nations have demonstrated this by the aid they have given to still less developed lands
of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America,
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There is no doubt tbat competition in aid to the deveiopi.9
countries by the West and by the Swid bloc has many advantapes
for the recipient countries which are thus placed in the novel and
favorable position of being able to pray one side against the other.
This competition, however, has k e n deeply colored by the cold
war. By contrast, technical and financial aid given by the UN,
whose officials strive to remain above the cold war and on the
whole succeed in maintaining a dispassionate attitude, can b
granted and accepted without regard to ideological or political
considerations.
It may only be realistic to expect that in the visible future individual nations will insist on giving a considerable portion, if not the
bulk, of the funds and skills they have available for foreign develop
ment either directly to recipient countries or tbrwgh regional con-

I
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dm,
thus deriving the satisfactiw of having their aid identified
as "Gift of the U.S." or "Gift of the West" or "Gift of the U.S.S.R."
Yet if the technologically advanced nations, irrespective of ideal*
gks, could be persuaded to pool their resources and to place, if not
the total, at teast a Iarger portion than in the past, under the
administrative supervision of the UN,three gains would be achieved.

advontuges of pooled mid
First, the p l e d aid could be allocated to the nations which seek
it in an orderly way, on a long-term basis (instead of year by year
as is now done by the United States), with some concern far
national long-term pIans which many governments have either
already adopted or are being urged to adopt. Witness our ten-year
Alliance for Progress program for Latin America.) The psychological and political tensions now created by the recurring need for
developing nations to go, hat in hand, to Moscow or Washington,
London or Born, for one kind of aid or another, and the resulting
temptation to blackmail the great powen engaged in the cold war
by threatening to seek aid from the other side would be eliminated.
Thus, over the years to come-and economists estimate that aid to
the &doping countries, if it is to prove effective, should be
planned for at least fifty years-a genuine partnership between the
"haves" and the "have nots" could be forged.
Second, the pooling of aid would permit tong-term planning on
a national as well as on a regional basis. This would eliminate the
dangers of duplication between requests for aid, competing individual projects, and nationalistic demands for undertakings which
may contribute to a country's prestige but not enhance its over-all
development, or strengthen one nation only while neglecting the
development of the region in which it is located.
Third, administration of aid by the UN would permit strict
supenision of the use made by each recipient country of the funds
allocated for its development. Such supervision is essential to the
honest and efficient operation of all aid programs. When exercised
by the UN, it could not be denounced by the recipients as "imperialism" or "intervention" or "strings attached"-accusatians which
are often made against individual contributing nations. Impartial
bookkeeping scrutiny by the LIN could also check at their inception
18

such wastage and mismanagement of millions of dollars in aid 9s
has frequently occurred when aid has been regarded as a weapon in
the cold war.
Growing acceptance of the value of economic assistance through
the UN and other international agencies would spur comparable
cooperation in social development.
It is clear even to the non-specialist that today no one n a t i o ~
can rely solely on its own scientific resources, and that all would
benefit by m r a t i v e use of the discoveries of all. If isolation ever
seemed an advantage in the past. today it can spell stagnation or
decline with a resulting political discontent that might spark new
revolutions. The most dramatic example of the need for world
cooperation in science was the orbiting of the earth by both
American and Soviet astronauts. The achievements of Glenn and
Titw gave new hope to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, which had been inactive since its creation in 1959
because of Moscow's objections to the composition of its membership. Now composed of 28 members, the Committee was spurred
to activity by the pledges of both President Kennedy and Premier
Khrushchev to collaborate in this sphere. Cooperation in less
dramatic but equally important fields such as the prevention and
cure of various diseases was urged by both President Kennedy and
former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The exchange of ideas
among the world's many cultures is encouraged by UNESCO. And
the UN's Technical Assistance Program offers a pool of experience
an which all nations can draw.

I

orms and mankind
But while men look to outer space, the most difficult problem on
earth remains that of armaments, including nuclear weapons. The
UN Charier had prwided for the establishment of a Military
Committee of the great powers and the allocation by each member
nation of contingents of armed forces as well as air units to the UN
through bilateral treaties. Sucb cooperation, however, has hitherto
been blocked by the failure of the great powers, aligned against
each other in the cold war after 1 947, to agree about the reduction
of armies, navies, and air forces. The double goal set forth in the
UN Charter of regulating and controlling national armaments and

rn
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at the same time assuring the security of all members of the UN
through an international force has so far proved unattainable.
As a result of this failure to establish a system of m1Iective
security, U N members have invoked Atticle 51 of the Charter

which permits individual or collective selfdefense in case of attack.
The Soviet blw in the late 1940% went ahead and formed its
Warsaw military group; and the Western nations, in response to
Communist encroachments in Europe, Asia. and the Middle East,
organized NATO. SEATO, CENT0 (the former Baghdad pact),
and ANZUS. Meanwhile, the United States and the Latin American
countries continued to rely on the OAS for their hemispheric de-

fense arrangements.

future of nueleor weapons
These already thorny probterns were made more difficult by the
complcx ta5k of averting nuclear war through such measures as a
ban on further nuclear tests. control and inspection agreements that
might be made to enforce a test ban, and methds of disposing
of f l nuclear bombs now stockpiled by the great powers. In the UN,
the overwhelming majority of member nations neither possess nor
have the capacity to prduce nuclear weapons. They have, therefore. expressed a deep concern about these weapons which could,
without their participation or consent and without any discussion
in the UN forum, be unleashed by the three powcrs which have the
capability to produce nuclear bombs on a large scale-the United
States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R.
The prolonged negotiations of the Big Three in Geneva and the
resumption of nuclear testing by the United States in April 1962,
following Moscow's September 1961 test series, heightened the
realization that, as time passed and scientific knowledge became
mare widespread, other nations might enter the nuclear race.
Among them are France, which has already tested nuclear bombs
in the Sahara, and Communist China, which is expected to manufacture bombs within two or three years, not to speak of smaller
nations which might also make a bid to enter the nuclear "dub."
We must realize that as long as the struggle for power continues,
the nations which possess the most effective weapon will seek to
improve it and to accumulate a stockpile. against future emergen20

cies. It is understandable that the United States and Britain want
controlled inspection to prevent the U.S.S.R. from secretly conducting tests while it officially accepts a test ban treaty. It is also
understandable that the U.S.S.R., which at least until 1961 lagged
behind the United States both in technoIogy and in nuclear c a p W ity, should feel uneasy about the prospect that controlled inspection
might have the result of freezing its annaments at a level lower
than that of the United States, and particularly that of the United
States allied with West Germany.
No practicable solution of the problem of armaments is as yet in
sight. From the time man first appeared on earth the possmion of
arms has been regarded as a symbl of power and a safeguard of
security for the individual, the tribe, and the nation. As Adlai E.
Stevenson has pointd out, "General and complete disarmament
envisages a degree of national restraint and of international intervention in the affairs of states, which are absolutely unprecedented."
It is a step forward, however, that nuclear negotiations under
the UN's sponsorship were resumed in 1962 by an eighteen-nation
conference instructed to seek ''general and complete disarmament
under effective international control." T h i s conference consisted of
the three Western nuclear powers and Canada (France refused to
attend); five Communist countries; and eight neutralist nations of
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and b i n America which are not
directly associated either with NATO or with the Warsaw Pact.
The discussions of this conference, although inconclusive, at least
afforded an opportunity for nations other than those which now
manufacture nuclear weapons ta present their views about possibilities of reducing the danger of nuclear war:

I

UN peace force
It is customary to describe all efforts to regulate or reduce weapons
by the term "dismament." In actuality, the goal of those concerned with the deveIopment of a workable world community is
not complete disarmament-that is, the abolition of all weapons
and weaponeem-but the creation of conditions under which it
would prove possible to place aH then existing weapons and armsd
forces under the supervision of the UN, leaving limited contingents
d security forces in the member nations for internal security only.

This ultimate goal assumes that even if the world's governments
agree some day to forhar from the use of force to protect their
inten&, the wodd organization would still need armed forces and
weapons to carry out a variety of peacekeeping operations. Some
of these operations will be the policing of disputed areas to prevent
clashes between contending states, such as that performed since
1956 in the Gaza strip between Israel and Egypt by a UN Emergency Force (UNEF)composed of units contributed by ten nations,
seven of them neutralist including India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia,
and since 1958 by a UN group in Kashmir, along the cease-fire
h e between India and Pakistan. Others may be far larger in scope,
such as the UN military operation in the Congo (ONUC), which
was designed to restore peace in a newly liberated colony, prevent
civil war, and avert the possibility that the two great-power blocs
might become involved in the struggle between Congolese leaders.
Some speak of a UN police force; others use the phrase Peace
Force. Whatever its name, it would be designed to perfom for the
world organization the same function that a police force perfoms
witbin nation-states.
But, some ask, would disarmament, even in limited form, prove
a blessing or a curse?
Some economists in nation-states have been concerned over the
prospect that reduction of armaments, let alone complete disarmament,might precipitate a catastrophic decline in national economi~
which have Qome to rely on arms production. However, a UN
committee of experts from ten nations of both East aod West
reported early in 1962 that wmplete world disarmament could
lead to wide development and prosperity rather than to economic
depression if govements planned for it adequately in advance. In
their opinian, "the achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to dl mankind."

paying for peace
The experience of the UN has revealed a frfth aspect essential for
the making of peace. This is that for all its operations, maIl and
large, the UN needs funds. In the past the UN has had a nearly
perfect record of obtaining regular assessments from its m e m b e w
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100 per cent for the four years 1956-59, and close to 95 pet
for 1960 as shown by collections at the end of 1961. As W
Lippmam has pointed out, "All this goes to show that the
and conventional activities of the UN are financially souad and
that they have the support of the whole membershipwest, East
and neutral."
Yet in 1961 the UN's budget showed a serious deficit. This
deficit was caused wt by regular budget expenditures but by two
special operations: the UN Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip,
consisting of 5,000 men, and costing $20 million a year; and the
Congo force, which as of January 1962 consisted of 16,000 soldiers
contributed by 2 1 countries, whose average cost since July 1960
has been about $10 million a month. These two operations are
not part of the regular budget, and thus the member nations which
objected to them could avoid making contributions without fear of
Imhg their Mte in the General Assembly. The U.S.S.R. refused
to pay for either the Gaza Strip or the Congo operation. So did the
Arab countries.Fmce, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and
South Africa refused to pay for the Congo force. Some others,
among them Latin American countries, made no contributions to
the special operations and were also in arrears on their annual
budget assessments. The United States supported both operations,
and in the case of the Congo, paid 40 to 50 per cent of the cost.
The U.S.S.R. has refused to pay assessments on special operations
on the ground that everything the Security C o d and the General
Assembly have done in organizing armed forces is illegal. But the
Charter (Article 17) states that "expenses of the organization shall
be borne by the members as apportioned by the Cfeneral Assembly."

UN bond issue
To put an end to this situation, which would have left the UN with
a dangerous deficit and made it impossible for it to undertake
future peace-keeping operations opposed by any of its members,
the General Assembly in 1961 requested the opinion of the International Court of Justice as to whetber the costs of these operations
could be regarded as part of the UN's regular expenses. By a 9 to 5
vote the court ruled on July 20, 1962, that all members were
obligated to pay all of the UN assessments, but its opinion was

advisory, and penalties for non-payment, if any, would have to
be imposed by the Generat Assembly.

US. experience
The selective method of paying for the expenses of an organization
of states should be familiar to Americans who remember this
nation's experience under the Articles of Confederation. At that
time it soon became apparent that requisitions on states by Congress would not yieId the sums needed for the proper operation of
the Confederation. In the first two years under the Articles,
Congress asked for ten million dollars and received less than 1.5
million. During the entire period of the Confederation, the amount
redized from requisitions barely met the government's operating
expenses, leaving nothing over to be applied to interest on the debt.
In 1786 New Jersey-not unlike the governments of some UN
membe-resolved
not to pay its quota until Congress was given
exclusive power to regulate foreign trade. It was then jealous of
New Yark and Pennsylvania which obtained revenue from foreign
trade on g o d s destined for New Jersey. Congress sent a commission to New Jersey in an effort to persuade that state to comply
with its requisitions, but the commission's efforts proved fruitless.
Today the UN is still at the stage where it is a loose confederation
of nations, each of which insists on maintaining its national sovereignty and asserts the right to support UN operations when it
wishes and to withhold its support from operations it finds unpalatable. The UN is as yet far from being "the Federation of the
World" envisaged by Alfred Lord Tennyson in his poem Locksley
Hall, let alone-a world government.
what kind of UN?
The basic question which confronts us is whether the UN is to
continue to be a loosely organized
Concert of the World, comparable on a global scale to the
Concert of Europe of the 19th
century. Or should the UN be
relegated to the background, and

should the United States support instead a "Concert of Free
Nations" of the Atlantic area, as urged by Senator J. William
Fulbright? Or is the UN to become a close-knit federation composed of nation-states, whether or not grouped in a variety of
regional organizations, endowed by its members with the authority
to act on their behalf on a wide range of subjects, from economic
developments to arms control, from social welfare to prevention of
armed clashes in disputed areas?
static or dynamic?
This fundamental problem was stated with clarity and force by the
Iate UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in his annual 1961
report on the UN,made pubiic after his death in Ndola, Rhodesia.
In this report, which constituted his Iast testament, discussing
different concepts of the UN, Mr.Hammarskjold wrote:
On the om side, if has in various ways become cleur that
cermin Members conceive of the Organization as a static
conference mmhinery for resolving conflictsof interedx and
ideologies with a view to peaceful co+xistence, within the
Charter, to be served by a Secretarial which is to be regarded not as fully internationalized but as representing
within its ranks t h e very interests and ideologies.
Other Members have made it clear char they conceive of
the Organization primarily ps a dynamic instrument of
Governments through which they should aLso try to
develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of
ail Members, and aiming at forestailing conptcts and resolving them, once they have arisen, by appropriate diplomatic
or political means, in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation of the principle3 and pltrposes of the Charter. . . .

The first concept can rejer to history and to the rraditiom
of national policies af the past. The second can point to the
needs of the present and of the future in a world of evercloser inrernationai interdependence where nations have at
their disposal armaments of hitherto unknown destructive
strength. The first one i.r firmly anchored in the rim25

honored philosophy of sovereign national States in armed
competition of which the most that may be expected in the
imernatiod &Id is that they m&vs a peaceful m-existeme.
The second one envisages possibilities of inter-governmental
ation ovemmdingsuch a philosophy, and opem the road
t o w 4 more dwefoped and incremingly effectivefonns of
constructive internurional coopemtiorr.

dynamio--ond dispassionate

Mr.Hammarskjald's analysis of the UN in the sixth decade of this
century left no doubt of bis own belief that the world o m t i o n
should play a role that wwld k both dynamic and dispassionate.
In his view it should look beyond the horizons of nation-states,
wbich in an interdependent world have become relatively as narrow
as t h e of medievaI villages, and at the same time should serve
all nations through a Secretariat of "an exclusively internationa1
character." This Secretariat should be recruited on as wide a
geographical basis as possible, in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter, but should not be designed to give "a balanced
representation of trends or ideologies," such as had been urged
by the U.S.S.R. which wanted the UN to be directed by a troika
of three executive officers representing respectively the Western,
Communist, and neutralist nations.

"the house'' as world's shelter
It will take time for nation-states to become accustomed to the idea
of a strong world organization-prhaps as long as it took for the
barons and princes of feudal Europe to accept a strong national
executive representing the interests of all and actixlg an behalf of
all within the state's geographic boundaries. But as more and more
nations enter the UN,they are becoming gradually accustomed to
think of the world organization, which French-speaking people call
%e house" (la mmmn-a
term applied to the place of one's
employment) not as an alien institution to be viewed with suspicion,
but as the best shelter yet devised for mankind Acceptance of this
attitude toward the world community is not easy. I t involves a sort
of international weightlessness-an adaptation of body and mind to
a new dimension in human affairs.
26
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ROAD 10 THE
This adaptation has
emerged nations, wbi
assumed, that the non-aligned countries refuse
ments to the UN. On the mtraty, many of

and hospital faciiiti
or the Congo.

The significant point is that the non-aligned countries have
undertaken wmiments not to military alliances of contending
blocs, but to the world community represented in our time by the
UN. By doing so they have blazed a road to a new relationship
among nations, a relationship in which the joint defense of all
would become the responsibility not of a few, but of all; in which
all nations would be both non-aligned and c o m m i t t e a m m i t t e d
not to one great power or mother, but to the world wmmunity.
Some Westerners, particularly in the United States and France, stiU
believe that there must be a choice between national or regional
arrangements and the development of a world organization. The
issue is not one of "either+rU but of making effective use of all
the roads avaiIable to maakmd.

I

toward a multi-putriotism?
No thoughtful person is so brash as

to assert unhesitatingly that
history will follow this or that course-and dogmatists who have
done so have found their predictions challenged in their own lierime by actual events. But there is a growing awareness throughout
the world that we are at a turning-point such as must have been
reached when nation-states emerged at the end of the Middle Ages
in Europe-a turning-point toward larger organizations of human
beings than the nation. And this sense of larger organizations in the
making also brings a sense of a world community where the individual will have several loyalties-not only to his own nation,
but to a regional group such as Europe or the Organization of

I

American States, and to the still vaster group which today e m b m
most of the peoples of the world and which tomorrow may embrace
them an. We would all then have more than one patrie and more
than one patriotism, But these various loyalties would not need to
d c t any more than we now fmd a conflict in the United States
between the loyalty of each of us to our f d y , to our state, to the
various o q a n k a t i o ~with
~ ~ which we are associated in work and
civic responsibilities, and to the nation which embraces them all.
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